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Summary 
This paper examines ideas of individual freedom in the Hellenistic city-states (c. 323–31 
BC). It concentrates on the civic ideas expressed in the laws and decrees of Hellenistic cities, 
inscribed on stone, comparing them with Hellenistic historical and philosophical works. It 
places different Hellenistic approaches alongside modern liberal, neo-Roman republicanand 
civic humanist theories of individual liberty, finding some overlaps with each of those 
modern approaches. The argument is that the Hellenistic Greeks developed innovative ways 
of combining demanding ideals of civic virtue and the common good with equally robust 
ideals of individual freedom and ethical choice. They did so not least by adapting and 
developing traditional Greek approaches close to modern civic humanism, in ways very 
relevant to modern debates about how to reconcile civic duty, the common good and 
pluralism.   
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1. Introduction 
This paper analyses ideas about the freedom of the citizen of a city-state (polis) which were 
debated during the Hellenistic period (c. 323–31 BC).1 That period covers the centuries after 
the conquests of Alexander the Great, which precipitated the expansion of polis culture across 
the eastern Mediterranean and beyond. Citizens of Hellenistic poleis were the contemporaries 
of the most vibrant period of republican thinking and practice in Rome, which has been so 
stimulating for modern debates about liberty.2 Despite the flourishing of that republican 
centre at its western end, the Hellenistic world as a whole has often been seen as no fertile 
breeding ground for thinking about civic freedom and participation. It is true that the 
Hellenistic world was dominated politically by the large Hellenistic monarchies, the 
successors to Alexander’s empire (especially the Seleucids, Ptolemies and Antigonids), and 
then by the expanding Roman Empire. Nonetheless, self-governing Greek cities continued to 
exist, and flourish, within and between these empires, seizing opportunities to exercise 
political agency both within their own borders and in their relations with kings and Romans.3 
                                                          
 E-mail: b.gray@bbk.ac.uk 
1 Epigraphic corpora are cited here in accordance with the abbreviations in the Supplementum Epigraphicum 
Graecum. 
2 See e.g. Q. R. D. Skinner, ‘The Paradoxes of Political Liberty’, in S. McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner 
Lectures in Human Values, vol. VII (Cambridge, 1985), 227–50; V. Arena, Libertas and the Practice 
of Politics in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge, 2012). 
3 The continued flourishing of the polis and democracy in the Hellenistic period has now been richly 
demonstrated: see, for example, Ph. Gauthier, Les cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs (Athens and 
Paris, 1985); J. Ma., Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor, revised paperback edition 
(Oxford, 2002); V. Grieb, Hellenistische Demokratie: politische Organisation und Struktur in freien 
griechischen Poleis nach Alexander dem Grossen (Stuttgart, 2008); P. Hamon, ‘Démocraties grecques 
après Alexandre : à propos de trois ouvrages récents’, Topoi 16.2 (2009), 347–82; Chr. Mann and P. 
Scholz (eds.), “Demokratie” im Hellenismus: Von der Herrschaft des Volkes zur Herrschaft der 
Honoratioren? (Mainz, 2012). 
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Hellenistic poleis’ citizens and intellectuals developed and promoted a vibrant, 
diverse range of ideas about the good polis and the good citizen. There was much diversity in 
approaches to citizenship across the wide sweep of the Hellenistic world, from modern 
France to modern Afghanistan, but this chapter will focus on some broad shared trends. 
Hellenistic citizens not only preserved earlier Greek civic ideals, but also adapted and 
reimagined them in order to preserve civic life within their new, increasingly cosmopolitan 
environment. The resulting Hellenistic ideas about democracy, civic virtue and citizenship, 
which have been much less intensively studied than their Classical Greek forerunners, add a 
different dimension to modern debates about ancient Greek approaches to the city and liberty, 
and their contemporary significance.4 In the case of Hellenistic ideals, this contemporary 
significance lies especially, I will argue, in Hellenistic citizens’ efforts to reconcile 
increasingly prominent ideas of individuality, individual entitlement and individual ethical 
choice with still demanding notions of the common good and political virtue.  
Hellenistic political debates can be studied through rich evidence for civic ideology 
and political thought preserved from many poleis. This evidence comes principally in the 
form of civic inscriptions: the decisions (decrees) and laws of cities which they inscribed on 
stone for public display. These inscriptions, often much richer and more complex in their 
rhetoric than those of the Classical period, tended to reproduce the language of the proposals, 
and supporting speeches, voted on by civic assemblies. They therefore give insights into 
Hellenistic civic rhetoric.5 
The available inscriptions make the Hellenistic period particularly well-suited to the 
application to ancient history of contextual methods in the study of political thought.6 This is 
because the rich rhetoric of routine, pragmatic Hellenistic inscriptions can be used to 
reconstruct the broader conceptual and linguistic worlds and debates within which 
contemporary intellectuals, especially historical authors (such as Polybius) and philosophers 
(such as the Stoics), developed their more reflective and sophisticated political language and 
arguments. Consideration of Greek civic language and ideas in this period also enriches the 
contextual background informing our understanding of Roman republican political thought: 
the citizens and intellectuals of the Roman Republic were in constant contact with the civic 
life and thought of the Greek East; and elite Roman education was based on study of Greek 
philosophy and rhetoric, as well as Roman law.7 
The most pronounced, explicit interest of the Hellenistic cities in the specific value of 
freedom was a concern with collective freedom (eleutheria) and autonomy (autonomia): the 
freedom and autonomy of whole poleis, or of other political communities, such as federal 
leagues incorporating many cities. This was partly a matter of protecting the rule of the local 
demos (demokratia), and the integrity of its laws, from internal domination by a tyrant, or 
from lower-level political corruption. This was made most explicit in laws against tyranny, 
setting out procedures for pre-empting or counteracting tyrannical coups.8 
Truly free self-government by the local demos was also recognised as dependent on 
liberty from external domination. Indeed, cities made ideals of collective eleutheria and 
                                                          
4 For a recent investigation of this whole question: W. Nippel, Antike oder moderne Freiheit? Die 
Begründung der Demokratie in Athen und in der Neuzeit (Frankfurt, 2008). 
5 Compare A. Chaniotis, ‘Paradoxon, Enargeia, Empathy: Hellenistic Decrees and Hellenistic Oratory’, in Chr. 
Kremmydas and K. Tempest (eds.), Hellenistic Oratory: Continuity and Change (Oxford, 2013), 201–216. 
6 See e.g. Q. R. D. Skinner, Visions of Politics. Vol. I: Concerning Method (Cambridge, 2002). 
7 See E. S. Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, two volumes (Berkeley, 1984); E. Rawson, 
Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic (London, 1985); J.-L. Ferrary, Philhellénisme et impérialisme : 
Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique, de la seconde guerre de Macédoine à la 
guerre contre Mithridate (Rome, 1988). 
8 For these laws, see D. Teegarden, Death to Tyrants! Ancient Greek Democracy and the Struggle against 
Tyranny (Princeton 2014). 
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autonomia central to their complex diplomatic negotiations with kings and Romans.9 As Ma 
shows, this involved intricate, sometimes paradoxical rhetoric: cities had to represent 
themselves as grateful, loyal beneficiaries of grants from above, including guarantees of 
freedom, while also asserting that they were securely independent from their benefactors, 
partly as a result of those (continuing) benefactions themselves. In the 190s BC, for example, 
the Iasians of Western Asia Minor used their intact civic institutions and collective political 
will to award extensive praise and honours to the Seleucid Antiochos III, noting that he had 
freed their city from slavery, by removing the preceding Antigonid garrison, and that he was 
guarding their demokratia and autonomia.10 In the early first century BC, the city of Ephesus 
could even present its resistance to the anti-Roman rebel Mithridates of Pontus as aimed at 
upholding, simultaneously, both Roman hegemony (hegemonia) and ‘common freedom’ 
(koine eleutheria).11  
This Hellenistic interest in collective freedom, which has been quite intensively 
researched, has much relevance to modern debates about sovereignty, and the multiple 
complex, hybrid or partial forms it can take.12 The Hellenistic cities foreshadow modern 
attempts to develop complex notions and practices of collective freedom and autonomy, 
which move away from assertion of unilateral, unbridled independence, to create more scope 
for negotiation and compromise with both superior powers and peers.  
The focus of this paper is, however, the less intensively studied issue of the role of 
individual freedom in Hellenistic civic discourse and political thought.13 To some degree, 
concern with individual citizen freedom was implicit in Hellenistic rhetoric about collective 
eleutheria and autonomia. It is a commonplace of much modern political theory that the 
collective freedom of a whole republic, enshrined in laws and a constitution, trickles down 
into individual freedom for its citizens. Some Hellenistic Greeks may well have recognised a 
similar close connection between collective and individual freedom. The link was implicit in 
the use of the adjective eleutheroi, the plural of eleutheros (‘free’), to describe citizens of free 
cities;14 this suggested that each citizen took his own share in his city’s freedom. It is, 
however, significant that Hellenistic citizens did not often make the link explicit. In general, 
they did not tend to focus on the consequences of collective eleutheria and autonomia for the 
standing of individual citizens or groups within the collective, vis-à-vis their peers.15 
Tellingly, Hellenistic Greeks, like their Classical predecessors, did not normally talk about 
the political eleutheria or autonomia of individual citizens in their relations with fellow 
citizens, or with their polis: they did not establish a verbal analogy between the freedom of a 
                                                          
9 See Ma, Antiochos III; Grieb, Hellenistische Demokratie; S. Dmitriev, The Greek Slogan of Freedom and 
Early Roman Politics in Greece (Oxford and New York, 2011); S. Wallace, The Freedom of the Greeks in the 
Early Hellenistic Period. A Study in Ruler-City Relations (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 
2011). 
10 Ma Antiochos III, text no. 26B, col. I, ll. 9–18, together with the broader analysis in Ma’s ch. 4. 
11 I.Ephesus 8, ll. 11–12. 
12 See, for example, H. Kalmo and Q. R. D. Skinner (eds.), Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and 
Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge, 2010). 
13 Classical Athenian ideas of personal freedom have, by contrast, been intensively studied: see recently, for 
example, R. Wallace, ‘Law, Freedom and the Concept of Citizens’ Rights in Democratic Athens’, in J. Ober and 
C. Hedrick (eds.), Demokratia: A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern (Princeton, 1996), 105–
119; R. Wallace, ‘Personal Freedom in Greek Democracies, Republican Rome, and Modern Liberal States’, in 
R. Balot (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought (Chichester and Malden, 2009), 164–77; A. 
Saxonhouse, Free Speech and Athenian Democracy (Cambridge, 2006); P. Cartledge and M. Edge, ‘“Rights”, 
Individuals, and Communities in Ancient Greece’, in Balot, A Companion to Greek and Roman Political 
Thought, 149–63; P. Liddel, Civic Obligation and Individual Liberty in Ancient Athens (Oxford, 2007). 
14 E.g. A. Chaniotis, Die Verträge zwischen kretischen Städten in der hellenistischen Zeit (Stuttgart, 1996), text 
40c, l. 13 CID 4.104, l. 5 (concerning the citizens of Delphi, in an early second-century letter to the Delphic 
Amphictyony from a Roman commander); compare Polybius 18.44.2. 
15 Polybius’ approach to the Achaian League, discussed in section 2, is a significant exception. 
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polis among other poleis and powers, on the one hand, and the freedom of the individual 
citizen among other citizens, on the other. When it was used to describe the standing of an 
individual vis-à-vis other individuals or groups, eleutheria was predominantly used to pick 
out the legal status of a free person, as opposed to a slave; for reasons explored further 
towards the end of section 2, personal eleutheria was not normally a question of political 
liberty. 
When it came to representing the good internal functioning of civic life and good 
inter-citizen relations in their public, inscribed rhetoric, Hellenistic citizens tended to 
emphasise other values than individual freedom: in particular, core values of civic virtue, 
civic engagement, benefaction to the community, reciprocity and reciprocal justice, captured 
in concepts such as justice (dikaiosyne), equality (isotes), virtue (arete), love of honour 
(philotimia), solidarity (philia) and gratitude (charis). The stability and success of a polis 
were presented as built on these foundations, rather than directly on the individual free status, 
action, thinking and speech of its citizens. Conversely, it was recognised that these 
foundations of civic life could be directly undermined by tyrannical or external domination.16 
Although these other values were dominant in Hellenistic civic discourse, it is 
nonetheless possible to detect signs of an accompanying interest in something with 
significant similarities to the modern notion of individual freedom – similarities sufficiently 
significant to warrant identifying a Hellenistic interest in the freedom of the individual citizen 
within the polis, vis-à-vis fellow citizens. In order to identify these signs, it is necessary to 
look beyond the conventional vocabulary of freedom (eleutheria, autonomia). On the one 
hand, it is necessary to take account of other vocabulary (e.g. prohairesis or hairesis, with a 
basic meaning of ‘choice’). On the other, it is also important to reconstruct concepts and 
ideas which were expressed or embodied in Hellenistic rhetoric, institutions and practices, but 
which Hellenistic citizens did not come to describe using a single word or words. 
In an example of the latter approach, analysis of some Hellenistic laws and rhetoric 
reveals an interest in what can be classed, following proposals of D. Held, as ‘protective’ 
forms of individual freedom:17 freedom from interference, or from domination or 
dependence. These ‘protective’ forms are the focus of the next section (section 2). In other 
contexts, Hellenistic citizens concentrated, partly through their interest in prohairesis and 
hairesis, on the other main type of individual liberty distinguished by Held: ‘developmental’ 
freedom. According to a ‘developmental’ approach, active participation in a polis enables 
citizens to develop, and put into action, their human capacities; it thus secures the freedom of 
self-realisation, which may also involve a degree of self-mastery. Section 3 discusses 
Hellenistic concern with this second type of freedom.  
Interpreting Hellenistic civic ideas about freedom through these lenses contributes to 
the project of this volume by enabling comparison with three prominent approaches to 
individual liberty in contemporary political theory: the approaches which have come to be 
known as liberal, neo-Roman republican, and civic humanist.18 Although Held introduces his 
‘protective’ and ‘developmental’ dichotomy to distinguish neo-Roman republicanism from 
what has come to be defined as civic humanism, a broad notion of ‘protective’ freedom can 
also, as he acknowledges, incorporate liberal approaches. These liberal approaches constitute 
a broad family, whose shared characteristic is to identify freedom as protection of individuals 
from obstacles to the pursuit of their life projects. Under liberalism, all citizens are 
encouraged to pursue their interests and projects, provided that doing so does not interfere 
                                                          
16 See I.Ilion 1 (c. 280 BC) for a polis envisaging the disruption caused by tyrannical rule to everyday civic life. 
17 See D. Held, Models of Democracy, third edition (Stanford, 2005), 35, distinguishing ‘protective’ from 
‘developmental’ forms of republicanism, adapting older distinctions between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ liberty. 
18 Compare Nippel, Antike oder moderne Freiheit?, for discussion of overlaps and differences between ancient 
and modern liberty. 
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with the similar freedoms of other citizens. The whole system is guaranteed and reinforced 
through a system of fair laws and fair procedures for resolving disputes and co-ordinating 
action. 
Liberalism has a key difference from the other main ‘protective’ approach, neo-
Roman republicanism, inspired by the Roman Republic. That republican approach identifies 
freedom, not merely with protection against actual interference, but with protection against 
the very possibility of arbitrary interference. If there are strong defences within a state against 
any such arbitrary interference, each of its individual citizens can live free from the threat of 
domination by, or dependence on, the will of any other individual. This ambitious type of 
freedom can be achieved, according to neo-Roman republican arguments, only through a 
complex  participatory system of government, in which citizens collaborate in making laws to 
bind them all, governing the republic, and protecting the republic and its laws. The key 
difference between this approach and the main modern ‘developmental’ approach, which 
contemporary political theorists have come to describe as ‘civic humanism’, is that civic 
humanism treats civic participation and civic virtue, not as instrumental to protecting the 
freedom of individual citizens, but as goods in themselves, intrinsic to a good and free life for 
individuals.19 The term ‘civic humanism’ has a complex twentieth-century history in the 
historiography of the Italian Renaissance, and is sometimes used in a looser way, but I am 
using it here solely as many contemporary political theorists do, to denote this particular 
basic theory of citizenship and the good life, distinguished from neo-Roman republicanism. 
A key historical question is how the Hellenistic Greeks responded to their 
contemporaries in the Roman Republic. Did Hellenistic Greeks, influenced by their 
contemporaries in the Roman Republic, inflect their civic ideals with republican principles, 
placing a particular stress on the role of civic institutions, virtues and participation in securing 
freedom from domination and arbitrary power, both for whole cities and for their constituent 
citizens and parts? Or did Hellenistic Greeks preserve and adapt a distinctive Greek tradition, 
closer to modern civic humanism, which treated civic participation and substantial civic 
virtue more as goods in themselves, crucial to self-realisation? This paper finds traces of both 
tendencies. Hellenistic cities did take a strong interest in ‘protective’ freedoms, though often 
in a way more attractive to modern liberals than to modern republicans. There is, however, 
much more compelling evidence, especially from the later Hellenistic period, for Hellenistic 
citizens’ interest in revising and enriching, and applying to their day-to-day civic life, Greek 
traditions closer to civic humanism. 
 
2. The ‘protective’ role of the Hellenistic polis: guaranteeing ‘protective’ liberty? 
This article will focus on the rhetoric of inscribed civic decrees, but this section starts with 
Polybius, because he is the most explicit Hellenistic advocate of ‘protective’ liberty. Indeed, 
he is perhaps the closest thing to a neo-Roman republican thinker among Hellenistic Greeks. 
His analysis of the Roman Republic has itself strongly influenced the subsequent republican 
tradition. Significantly for the purposes of this article, Polybius also applied his political 
approach to contemporary Greek cities and states, especially his home state, the Achaian 
League, a complex federation incorporating many of the poleis of the Peloponnese. Polybius 
presents the federal Achaian League as a model of a true democracy. According to him, its 
diverse member cities participated voluntarily, on equal terms, within a framework of shared 
institutions (magistrates, councillors, laws, courts, coinage and weights and measures). The 
system was based on equality before federal laws and institutions for all members, regardless 
                                                          
19 See Skinner, ‘The Paradoxes of Political Liberty’, for an overview of the modern debate concerning these 
three models of liberty; compare Held, Models of Democracy, 35. 
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of size or length of membership. This institutional set-up was reinforced through equality and 
frankness of speech (isegoria and parrhesia) for all member cities and their citizens.20  
Polybius’ idealised vision of the Achaian League has many features which would 
appeal to modern liberals: his Achaian League was a voluntary association of states for their 
mutual security and advantage, which provided a contractual framework for them to pursue 
their overlapping interests, negotiate about their differences, and make reciprocal exchanges. 
This association of free states guaranteed property rights and prevented radical social reform. 
At the same time, its common currency and weights and measures enabled and reinforced 
profitable commercial relations among its free, property-owning members. 
In spite of the liberal connotations of some of Polybius’ picture, his account would 
probably appeal more directly to modern neo-Roman republicans. It is not entirely 
straightforward to capture Polybius’ approach to the precise nature of the freedom provided 
by the League to the parts within the whole, since he makes no systematic, explicit remarks 
on this question. Nonetheless, his various admiring comments about the League can be 
combined to reconstruct an approach to this issue with significant overlaps with modern 
republicanism. 
In Polybius’ presentation, the precise type of ‘protective’ political freedom (involving 
the protection of equality and frankness of speech – isegoria, parrhesia) which the League 
provided to all its members was of a different kind from any which an individual Hellenistic 
monarch or hegemonic polis could have bestowed; this was not simply a matter of liberal 
protections which any power structure could safeguard. This is because members’ freedom 
was guaranteed by an egalitarian, participatory legal and political framework including and 
binding all, rather than by any individual or individual city’s arbitrary, reversible will. 
Indeed, the whole structure of the League was designed to guarantee that no 
individual Peloponnesian city could dominate its neighbours. As Polybius explicitly 
comments, earlier leading cities in the Peloponnese had failed to unify the region, because 
they each sought their own domination (dynasteia), rather than ‘common freedom’ (koine 
eleutheria).21 By implication, the Achaian League had succeeded in creating common 
freedom, by unifying the Peloponnese within a system of political equality. Some members 
had joined willingly (as hairetistai), others through persuasion; and even those which had 
been forced to join had come to recognise the League’s attractions. Also in accordance with 
the republican ideal, cities’ and citizens’ political participation – their exercise of equality and 
frankness of speech, isegoria and parrhesia – was not only enabled by this quasi-republican 
system, but also helped to sustain it.22  
The republican  thrust of Polybius’ model of the Achaian League could have had 
some earlier Athenian and wider Greek roots,23 but it is also consistent with his long 
residence in Rome: his civic thinking reflects the developing republican tradition of Rome 
itself, marked by its special concern with using political and legal structures to defend the 
free status of the individual (his libertas) against the possibility of slavish dependence or 
domination.24 This makes Polybius’ conception of freedom quite distinctive among 
Hellenistic approaches. Hellenistic philosophers of different schools certainly took a strong 
interest in how to achieve inviolable security and happiness for individuals, but they tended 
to see the route to it lying through the personal self-mastery secured by ethical knowledge, 
                                                          
20 Polybius 2.37.9–11; 2.38.6–8. 
21 Polybius 2.37.9. 
22 Polybius 2.38.6–8. This last point should be read as an overlap with republicanism at a basic conceptual level, 
rather than a practical level, because ancient Roman republicans, at least, were not so explicit in identifying 
political speaking, as opposed to voting, as central to liberty-guaranteeing political participation. Valentina 
Arena made this point to me. 
23 See Cartledge and Edge, ‘“Rights”’, on quasi-republican tendencies in the Classical Athenian democracy. 
24 See Arena, Libertas, esp. 46–8. 
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practice and virtue, not through political participation. They invoked politics mainly as a 
source of metaphors of power and control suitable for describing the well-governed, 
independent soul.25 
Though influenced by Roman thinking, Polybius did not simply take over Roman 
ideas, but adapted them in a way very relevant to modern political theory: he showed how 
quasi-republican institutions and values could be realised in a very large and heterogeneous 
community, including practically the whole Peloponnese.26 Indeed, it was probably partly the 
very federal character of the Achaian League which made it readily amenable to being 
represented as a quasi-republican  state. The Achaian League of Polybius’ day incorporated 
the many traditionally hostile states of the Peloponnese, including, for example, both Sparta 
and its longstanding enemies, Megalopolis and Messene. This made it straightforward to 
imagine bitter animosity within this enlarged political community, including mutual attempts 
to dominate fellow members; there was no difficulty in presenting League institutions as a 
defence against that animosity. In the case of a single polis, by contrast, it would have been 
problematic to start from the assumption that the individual members or parts would 
inevitably aspire to dominate one another. To Greek thinking, fellow citizens were normally 
members of a shared descent-group, bound by cults, history and values, whose instincts 
would be ones of solidarity, or at least rational co-operation. 
This is not to say that the Hellenistic poleis took no interest, in their inscribed public 
rhetoric, in ‘protective’ freedoms for their individual citizens. Their interest in such 
‘protective’ freedoms was often overshadowed by more community-centred, civic humanist 
concerns, of the kind explored in the next section. Nonetheless, it is clearly attested in certain 
kinds of inscribed civic texts: in particular, inscribed decisions re-establishing civic order 
after conflict or disorder,27 or creating civic order on a larger scale after some kind of merger 
of two poleis. 
It is probably fair to say, however, that when these texts express an explicit concern 
with the ‘protective’ freedom of individual citizens, their approach chimes more with modern 
liberal than with modern republican concerns: as explored below in the following paragraphs, 
their explicit concern is with the basic security of individual citizens and their property, and 
with the fair treatment of individual citizens through civic institutions. Here too relevant 
Hellenistic Greeks can be seen to have developed further ‘protective’ approaches already 
explored in the Classical Athenian democracy: in this case, Classical Athenian approaches 
partly resembling and partly sharply different from modern liberalism.28 In the case of 
inscriptions, even more than with Polybius, an obvious problem is that mainly pragmatic laws 
and decrees do not present systematic philosophies to underpin their contents: it is necessary 
to reconstruct the connecting threads of their approaches, sticking as closely as possible to 
their explicit language and provisions. 
One Hellenistic inscription likely to have been prompted by unrest is the civic oath 
which was sworn by all the citizens of the polis of Itanos on Crete in the early Hellenistic 
period. Citizens had to promise not to betray the city or its territory, or to engage in 
subversive meetings, but they also had to promise explicitly to respect the entitlements of 
individuals: they would not plot against any individual citizen, or interfere with individuals’ 
                                                          
25 Compare A. A. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (Oxford, 
2006), ch. 1, esp. 10. 
26 Polybius 2.37.11. For a full recent analysis of Polybius’ representation of the Achaian League, 
including his blending of Greek and Roman models: C. B. Champion, Cultural Politics in Polybius’ 
Histories (Berkeley, 2004), ch. 4. 
27 On such texts: A. Dössel, Die Beilegung innerstaatlicher Konflikte in den griechischen Poleis vom 5.-3. 
Jahrhundert v. Chr. (Frankfurt, 2003). 
28 See e.g. Wallace, ‘Law, Freedom and the Concept of Citizens’ Rights’ and ‘Personal Freedom’; Liddel, Civic 
Obligation. 
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private property or with relations of credit and debt.29 Explicit concern with the basic security 
of individual citizens against mistreatment could also surface in agreements merging together 
two poleis or settlements.30 
Other inscribed texts concerned with civic reconciliation or unification also often 
made explicit their concern to ensure the fair, just treatment of individuals. A common way to 
reconcile citizens or pre-empt conflicts in a Hellenistic city was to summon ‘foreign judges’ 
from another polis, as impartial interpreters or enforcers of local polis law. These foreign 
judges often started by trying to mediate or arbitrate between citizens, before resorting to 
formal judgement. It was routine for decrees praising such foreign judges to mention that 
they had acted fairly and justly in judging and settling cases, with respect for local law.31 The 
system of employing foreign judges could even be explicitly represented as designed to 
guarantee fair treatment for individuals. The clearest epigraphic expression of this view 
comes in a second-century BC decree passed by the Hellenistic citizens of Priene in Western 
Asia Minor, praising the people of the more northerly polis of Alexandria Troas for the way 
they had summoned Prienian foreign judges to resolve internal disputes. The Prienians claim 
that the Alexandrians have taken good care of the judges, ‘so that equal and just treatment 
may be provided for all citizens, because it is most of all through this that democracy is 
preserved’ (ὅπως ἴσα καὶ δίκαια π[ᾶσ]ι τοῖς πο[λίταις πα]ραγίνηται, διὰ τὸ μάλιστα διὰ τοῦτο 
τηρεῖσθαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν).32 
The Prienians thus associated closely the preservation of democracy with fairness and 
justice for individuals. The order of the causation in this statement chimes more with liberal 
than with republican emphases: the Prienians claimed that the key objective, from which 
democracy flows, is that each citizen should receive fair and just treatment. They appear to 
have held this aim to be paramount even if the fair treatment had to be guaranteed with the 
help of impartial outsiders, such as these foreign judges, rather than purely through the 
democratic interaction of fellow citizens. A republican would be likely to see the causality 
running in the opposite direction: democratic rule, involving full and equal participation by 
citizens (and only by citizens), ensures the best and most just outcome for individuals. 
In other cases, Hellenistic inscriptions did suggest or imply that participatory civic 
institutions, and associated civic virtues, could help to protect the entitlements of 
individuals.33 Those inscriptions did not, however, claim that civic institutions and virtues 
went beyond being helpful, towards being absolutely necessary for securing those individual 
protections. This was partly because the protections envisaged in such decrees, especially 
access to fair dispute resolution, were intrinsically amenable to being guaranteed equally well 
by impartial outsiders. Roman and neo-Roman republicanism, by contrast, concentrates on 
the role of civic institutions in protecting individuals’ distinctively political freedoms, which 
by their very nature can be guaranteed only by a participatory civic framework: the freedoms 
                                                          
29 IC III iv 8, ll. 14–16, 21–4. 
30 See, for example, SEG 26.1306 (union of Teos and Kyrbissos, early Hellenistic), ll. 4–5, 42–3 (requiring the 
Teians to swear not to abandon any one of the citizens living at Kyrbissos, as well as to defend the whole 
settlement militarily; property is not mentioned). 
31 E.g. W. Blümel and R. Merkelbach, Die Inschriften von Priene (Bonn, 2014), henceforth I.Priene2, no. 119, 
new edition of I.Priene 44, ll. 15–16. For discussion of the foreign judges phenomenon: C. V. Crowther, ‘Iasos 
in the Second Century BC: Foreign Judges from Priene’, BICS 40 (1995), 91–138; Dössel, Die Beilegung, 249–
72; A. V. Walser, ‘ΔΙΚΑΣΤΗΡΙΑ – Rechtsprechung und Demokratie in den hellenistischen Poleis’, in Mann 
and Scholz, “Demokratie” im Hellenismus, 74–108. 
32 I.Priene2 119, ll. 12–13. 
33 See, for example, the Coans’ praise for the civic virtue and devotion to the common good of their citizen 
Theugenes, who oversaw the effective running of a visit by foreign judges from Smyrna to resolve local 
disputes fairly for all citizens involved (IG XII 4 1 59, c. 150–100 BC, esp. ll. 23–30). Compare Classical 
Athenian ideology: Liddel, Civic Obligation, shows that fourth-century Athenian democrats saw individual 
liberty and the widespread performance of civic obligations as closely intertwined. 
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to participate and vote in civic institutions, whose exercise in turn guarantees the overarching 
libertas or liberty of the individual citizen from arbitrary domination or dependence.34 
Participating politically and voting in the polis were rarely treated by Hellenistic Greeks as 
individual or sectional entitlements or freedoms, in need of protection by the polis, or as 
means to secure each citizen’s discrete freedom from arbitrary domination. Rather, they were 
normally handled in a more ‘developmental’ than ‘protective’ vein: as civic duties, and as 
opportunities to participate in the civic community. This was a continuation of longstanding 
Classical Greek tendencies.35 Hellenistic citizens’ political participation and voting could be 
expected to be aimed at promoting the collective flourishing of the whole polis; but it could 
also be perceived as a legitimate opportunity to bargain with fellow citizens concerning 
interests, entitlements and just deserts, in order to achieve a mutually beneficial, equitable 
consensus.36 
One relevant Hellenistic example of approaches to voting comes from the end of the 
third century BC. At that point, a union of the two island poleis of Cos and Kalymna into a 
larger political unit, through a so-called homopoliteia, was established or re-established. All 
citizens of the unified polity had to swear the same oath. This oath required them to promise 
to respect and enhance the new enlarged polis. Each citizen also had to swear to act as both ‘a 
just judge and an equal citizen (δικαστὰς δίκαιος καὶ πολίτας ἴσος), voting by hand and stone 
(χειροτονῶν καὶ ψαφιζόμενος), without favour, for whatever seems to me to be beneficial for 
the demos’.37 Political participation, guided by standards of equality, justice and the common 
good, was thus a basic duty shared by all citizens. This shared participation was again valued 
partly for its instrumental role as a guarantee of fairness for individuals in dispute resolution 
in the courts. However, it was also, crucially, treated as a means to create solidarity and like-
mindedness, as opposed to catering for pluralism. The participatory political process was 
expected to help to bring out, and reinforce, solidarity and unity of purpose among citizens: 
in an example of a wider Hellenistic tendency, when the Coans some years later recorded the 
result of a vote on a motion to honour a citizen, 885 votes were recorded in favour, and none 
against.38 
Treating political participation and voting more as duties and opportunities than as 
protected entitlements was consistent with the more general approach of the Hellenistic cities 
to citizenship, and its characteristic practices. When granting citizenship or some of its 
privileges to outside individuals, cities could register in their decrees a concern with 
‘protective’ freedoms similar to those encountered above: in particular, the basic security of 
the person and property of the enfranchised individual within his new polis.39 Nonetheless, 
the dominant explicit aim of such decrees was not to protect the enfranchised individuals, but 
the crucial ‘developmental’ aim of enabling their full participation in the civic community:40 
citizenship grants often expressed the aspiration that those enfranchised as citizens should 
                                                          
34 See Arena, Libertas, esp. ch. 2. 
35 See, for example, A. Saxonhouse, Free Speech and Athenian Democracy (Cambridge, 2006). 
36 Compare B. Gray, Stasis and Stability: Exile, the Polis and Political Thought, c. 404–146 BC (Oxford, 2015), 
ch. 4, section 3. 
37 IG XII 4 1 152, ll. 27–9. 
38 IG XII 4 1 59, ll. 47–8. 
39 See, for example, IG II/III3 452 (Athens, 334 BC), ll. 31–4; SEG 53.565 (Phthiotic Thebes, third century BC, 
which must be either a citizenship grant or a grant reintegrating a pre-existing citizen on new terms), ll. 1–13. 
40 For this characteristic feature of Greek citizenship, contrasted with Roman, see the influential Ph. 
Gauthier, ‘La citoyenneté en Grèce et à Rome: participation et intégration’, Ktema 6 (1981), 167–79; 
and, more recently, citing much further bibliography, R. Brock, ‘Law and Citizenship in the Greek 
Poleis’, in M. Canevaro and E. Harris, The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Law; article published 
online August 2015, DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199599257.013.15. Concerning related ideas in 
Greek philosophy: M. Schofield, Saving the City: Philosopher-Kings and Other Classical Paradigms 
(London, 1999), ch. 8.  
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participate in, or have a share in (metechein), all the things already enjoyed in common by 
their new fellow citizens.41 
Others modern interpreters of the ideology of Hellenistic civic inscriptions might 
detect more signs of explicit concern with the protection of distinctively political freedoms 
for individual citizens. For one thing, the value of parrhesia (‘frankness of speech’), which 
elsewhere certainly evokes citizens’ protected equal entitlement to political participation (see 
above on Polybius), does occasionally feature in Hellenistic cities’ inscriptions. However, it 
is used to describe a personal virtue, rather than as a term for a protected individual 
entitlement. Even as a virtue parrhesia could in principle evoke particular protections 
guaranteed by the community for its members, which enable its exercise. However, 
Hellenistic inscriptions tended to attribute this virtue to benefactors in their relations, not with 
the home demos, but with powerful outsiders, especially kings. The Peripatetic philosopher 
Prytanis of Karystos was honoured by the Athenians for exercising parrhesia ‘as if on behalf 
of his own country’ in speaking up for Athenian interests as an envoy in the 220s BC.42 The 
Roman citizen and benefactor of Tenos L. Aufidius Bassus was said to have shown a similar 
type of parrhesia in a different context in the first century BC: as well as showing flexibility 
with regard to debts owed to him by the Tenians, he exercised justice, piety and ‘fitting 
parrhesia’ in trying to persuade those ‘burdening’ the citizens (τοὺς ἐπιβαροῦντας), perhaps 
especially other creditors, to desist.43 
The reason why parrhesia was not normally associated in Hellenistic decrees with 
public speech within the home demos was presumably that relations among fellow citizens 
were expected to be so equal, trusting and free of fear as to make a special, noteworthy 
degree of parrhesia unnecessary. Kings and other elite figures of the Hellenistic world, by 
contrast, had the power to threaten individuals who moved beyond flattery towards ‘saying 
everything’. An unusual case of a citizen being honoured for general parrhesia is the case of 
a second-century BC citizen of Pergamon, whose name is lost, who was honoured for having 
‘adorned his life with the finest parrhesia’ (κ[εκ]όσμηκε τὸν αὑτοῦ β̣ίον τῆι καλλίστηι 
παρρησίαι).44 This exceptional case is perhaps explained by the fact that Pergamon in the 
mid-second century was not only a polis but also the scene of a royal court, the Attalid court 
with which this man was intimately connected: the issue of speaking truth to the powers of 
the Hellenistic world was especially pertinent in this jointly civic and royal context. 
The other main reason why other modern interpreters might identify more concern 
with protection of individuals’ distinctively political liberties is that civic inscriptions of the 
kinds examined here often committed citizens to respecting the constitution or political 
system (politeia), and its constituent laws (nomoi). For example, the oath of unification from 
Cos-Kalymna strongly binds citizens not to overturn the existing politeia or nomoi;45 similar 
clauses are found in oaths of reconciliation after discord.46 These strong pledges of fidelity to 
the constitution might be seen as implicit promises by citizens to respect one another’s 
reciprocal, individual political liberties to participate and vote, within the framework of the 
institutions and laws of the politeia. 
                                                          
41 See, for example, FD III 3.214 (citizenship grant of the Chians to the Aetolians, mid-third century BC), ll. 8–
9; Tit. Cal. 53 (Kalymna, mid- to late third century BC), ll. 13–18. 
42 IG II/III3 1147, ll. 19–21; for a similar Hellenistic case of a foreigner praised for exercising parrhesia on 
behalf of the honouring city’s interests in diplomacy involving kings, see I.Kallatis 7 (honours of Kallatis for 
Stratonax and the people of Apollonia), ll. 11–15.  
43 IG XII 5 860, ll. 49–52. 
44 I.Pergamon I 224 (c. 150 BC), ll. 9–10; see also F. Canali De Rossi, Selezione di iscrizioni storiche tardo-
ellenistiche (Rome, 2000), no. 189. 
45 See IG XII 4 1 152, ll. 14–18, 21–3. 
46 See IG XII 4 1 132 (Telos, early Hellenistic), ll. 128–36. 
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This is indeed the most propitious ground for a quasi-republican interpretation of 
Hellenistic civic ideology on stone, and should be taken seriously. There is, however, a strong 
risk of anachronism in this interpretation: Hellenistic Greeks would have been more likely to 
see the defence of the politeia as serving principally the collective aims usually emphasised 
in the same decrees, especially stability, well-being, concord (homonoia), justice and shared, 
democratic rule.47 Those collective achievements created the framework for citizens to 
undertake the civic participation, sometimes explicitly presented as intrinsically rewarding 
for them, explored above and in section 3 below. 
There is a similar risk of anachronism in seeing decrees’ concern with upholding the 
politeia and democracy as expressing a more fundamental implicit aspiration, also quasi-
republican, to protect separate individuals, rather than the collective, from arbitrary 
domination or dependence. This is partly because of a factor which underlies many of the 
reasons already adduced for seeing Hellenistic cities’ ‘protective’ impulses as distinctive 
from republican ones. Roman republicans developed, in a way very influential on their 
modern successors, a global concept of an overarching condition of political libertas, which 
flows from and synthesises the separate rights (iura) of the free citizen, including especially 
the rights to vote and participate in decision-making.48 By contrast, the Hellenistic Greeks did 
not have a single, coherent, widely understood concept which pinpointed the overall result for 
the individual of the protections which the polis and citizenship provided. 
There is an obvious Greek word, eleutheria, which might in principle have come to 
denote such a concept, but it does not seem to have developed relevant meanings. Even when 
Hellenistic cities praised benefactors who had rescued or ransomed their citizens from literal 
captivity and slavery, they did not represent this returning of citizens to their proper, 
participatory role as citizens as a process of ‘freeing’ or ‘returning to freedom’: instead, as 
Bielman points out, they used the language of salvation (soteria), to describe these 
benefactors ‘saving’ captive and enslaved citizens.49 There were strong rhetorical 
considerations, particular to the circumstances, in play: cities did not want to give the 
impression that pirates or other captors of citizens had the capricious power to overturn the 
truly free status of their citizens, who would always remain proudly free people. This usage 
does, however, give an interesting insight into underlying Hellenistic thinking: such decrees 
exploited the assumption that personal free status was a fixed state into which an individual 
was normally born (though it could sometimes be achieved by special grant). Personal free 
status was not widely conceived, as in the Roman world, as an intrinsically mutable 
condition, dependent for its continuation on a complex matrix of legal institutions and law-
governed inter-personal relationships. This prominent Greek approach made the notion of 
personal eleutheria unsuitable for metaphorical development into a quasi-republican global 
notion of political liberty, conceived as freedom from any arbitrary domination and 
dependence, conditional on a matrix of political institutions and rights. 
To sum up this section, there are weaknesses in any stereotypical view of the Greek 
polis as obsessed with collective goods and unity, and uninterested in the protection of 
individual citizens and their entitlements. The Hellenistic poleis, developing approaches of 
their Classical predecessors, did take a marked, explicit interest in protecting their individual 
citizens, and thus with ‘protective’ freedoms.50 It is, however, significant that their interest in 
                                                          
47 See, for example, IG XII 4 1 132, esp. ll. 4–5, 125–6, 128–36. 
48 See Arena, Libertas, 47–8, discussing (for example) Cicero II Verrines 2.16, 5.143. 
49 A. Bielman, Retour à la liberté. Libération et sauvetage des prisonniers en Grèce ancienne. Recueil 
d'inscriptions honorant des sauveteurs et analyse critique (Athens, 1994), 212, 273, 332–3. 
50 I argue in Gray, Stasis and Stability, that this interest in the protection of citizens’ entitlements should be seen 
as one strand of a broader fourth-century and Hellenistic approach to politics, which I there call ‘Dikaiopolitan’. 
As I explain there, that ‘Dikaiopolitan’ approach also included more positive components, encouraging citizens 
to participate in bargaining through civic institutions to identify overlapping interests. 
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‘protective’ freedom was usually quite divergent from republican approaches; the Roman-
influenced Polybius is an interesting exception. The Hellenistic cities did not give special 
prominence to a paradigm of the always alert, ferociously independent individual citizen, 
anxious to avoid personal domination or dependence at all costs, with the aid of civic 
institutions. When they adopted a ‘protective’ approach, Hellenistic citizens did not widely 
subscribe to a global notion of ‘protective’ political freedom, along modern republican lines. 
Rather, they tended to envisage a range of loosely connected separate ‘protective’ freedoms 
with a social and economic focus, more in the manner of modern liberals. 
These separate ‘protective’ freedoms have been seen to include safety of person and 
status, or ‘salvation’ (soteria, as in documents about liberation from captivity); security of 
property and contracts; and access to fair, impartial and just civic institutions. Indeed, the 
safety (asphaleia) of both individuals and the polis could be seen to be guaranteed 
simultaneously by the smooth running of magistracies and checks on corruption.51 
Significantly, words such as soteria and asphaleia could readily be transferred from the 
collective to the individual, unlike eleutheria and autonomia. Hellenistic citizens were also 
sometimes promised by their polis other protections from threats to a baseline level of well-
being. They might expect to benefit from some protective ‘care’ (epimeleia) from their polis, 
at least indirectly, for example through public support and honours for doctors responsible for 
taking care of citizens.52 In addition to protection of their health, Hellenistic citizens might 
also expect some protection of their more immaterial well-being: protection of their honour 
(time), including against the hybris of possible challengers.53 Again more in the manner of 
modern liberals than republicans, Hellenistic cities valued ‘protective’ freedoms within this 
diverse assortment even if they had to be guaranteed through recourse to outsiders as 
impartial judges and arbitrators; Hellenistic cities might even welcome the role of Hellenistic 
kings in guaranteeing individual entitlements.54 Despite these different overlaps with modern 
liberalism, there are also crucial differences: for example, there is little attested Hellenistic 
civic interest in central liberal preoccupations such as protection of freedoms of thought or 
private life. 
Although stereotypical pictures of the Greek polis need to be revised in the light of 
these considerations, such stereotypes do also have a strong basis in historical reality: Greek 
cities did tend to concentrate in their self-presentation, not on protection of individual 
citizens, but more on the ‘developmental’ role of civic law, institutions and interaction in 
fostering individual character and self-fulfilment. They thus advocated something closer to 
the ‘Aristotelian perfectionism’,55 with strong affinities with the modern political theoretical 
category of civic humanism, which is often held to be the principal ancient Greek civic ideal. 
The overlaps of the Hellenistic poleis’ civic life and ideology with modern civic humanism 
are the concern of the next section. The Hellenistic poleis both developed and adapted the 
more civic humanist features of their Classical predecessors. They did so not least by 
introducing innovative ways of discussing individual ethical choice, even in the very public, 
widely accessible and apparently humdrum context of debates and decrees about honours for 
benefactors. 
 
 
                                                          
51 See I.Priene2 68, revised edition of I.Priene 112, ll. 20–27. 
52 See IG XII 4 1 30 (Cos, mid-third century BC), esp. ll. 7–10. 
53 It was, for example, normal in Greek poleis to describe the basic entitlements of citizens as ‘honours’, timai; a 
citizen who formally lost citizen rights was ‘without honour’ (atimos). See, for example, D. Kamen, Status in 
Classical Athens (Princeton, 2013), esp. 78; Schofield, Saving the City, 125. 
54 E.g. IG XII 4 1 135 (Naxos, c. 280 BC). 
55 See recently J. Cooper, ‘Political Community and the Highest Good’, in J.G. Lennox and R. Bolton (eds.), 
Being, Nature and Life in Aristotle (Cambridge, 2010), 212–64. 
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3. ‘Developmental’ liberty: enabling ethical choice in the Hellenistic polis 
The central conviction of modern civic humanism – that political participation and civic 
virtue make for the best life for an individual56 – was central to Classical Greek political 
philosophy, especially that of Aristotle and the Peripatetics. It was, however, in the later 
Hellenistic period (after c. 150 BC) that it was most eloquently and forcefully expressed in 
public political rhetoric with a practical focus and wide audience. Much Greek civic rhetoric 
and epigraphy, both Classical and Hellenistic, took for granted that civic participation and 
commitment were goods in themselves: for example, cities’ honorary decrees for citizens 
presented in glowing terms the honoured citizen’s life of civic contributions, which, they 
implied, was a lifestyle both admirable and desirable, good for both city and individual. In the 
later Hellenistic period, exceptionally, some civic honorary decrees spelled out the benefits of 
civic engagement for the citizen himself. Political participation and speech could be singled 
out: in the later second century BC, the citizens of Colophon praised their citizen Polemaios 
for judging to be fine the ‘adornment’ or ‘credit’ which comes to both his life and his country 
(τὸν ... τῶι βίωι καὶ τῆι πατρίδι κόσμον), not only from his bodily exertions in athletics, but 
also from his leading role in public affairs, exercised through  speech and political action 
(ἀπὸ τοῦ προίστασθαι τῶν κοινῶν λόγω<ι> καὶ πράξει πολιτικῇ).57 
Other types of civic engagement, especially financial solidarity with fellow citizens, 
could also be presented as beneficial for the engaged citizen himself. Perhaps the clearest 
case of a decree’s interest in the intrinsic importance of civic virtue for the virtuous citizen, as 
opposed to its extrinsic rewards in honour and prizes, comes in a later Hellenistic decree of 
the people of Priene for their citizen Athenopolis. The Prienians claimed that Athenopolis 
kept his promises of civic contributions, recognising that what ‘belongs to himself most all’, 
or perhaps ‘is most important for himself’, is his assiduousness towards those together with 
whom he conducts his life (νομίζων το[ῦτο α]ὑτῶι μέγιστον ὑπάρχειν τὸ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς 
συν̣α̣ναστρ[ε]φ̣ο[̣μέν]ους ἐκτένειαν συντηρεῖν).58 Still later in the Hellenistic period, the 
Prienians honoured A. Aemilius Zosimos, a naturalised citizen of Priene. They praised him 
for loving Priene as if it were his own fatherland, and contributing enthusiastically to Prienian 
civic life, at the expense of his narrow private interests: he did so ‘knowing that virtue alone 
brings the greatest fruits and signs of gratitude from foreigners and citizens who hold the fine 
in honour’ (συνιδὼν δ’ ὅτι μόνη μεγίστους ἀποδίδωσιν ἡ ἀρετὴ καρποὺς καὶ χάριτας π[αρὰ 
ξένοις κ]α̣ὶ ἀστοῖς τὸ καλὸν ἐν τιμῇ θεμένοις).59 The ‘fruits’ which only civic virtue could 
procure for Zosimos presumably included the honours he received, but they could well also 
have been seen to include the intrinsic benefits of fulfilling the role proper to anyone 
belonging to a community, alluded to in the earlier Athenopolis decree.60 Those intrinsic 
benefits were also invoked by the Otorkondeis, a sub-division of Mylasa to the south, when 
in 76 BC they praised the citizen Iatrokles for releasing struggling debtors from their debts, 
‘thinking that justice is more profitable than injustice’ (λυσιτελεστέραν ἡγούμενος τὴν 
δικαιοσύ[νην] τῆς ἀδικίας).61 
It might be thought that, through these more civic humanist and ‘developmental’ 
aspects of their ideology, the Hellenistic cities reproduced community-centred features of the 
Classical Greek polis and Classical Greek political thinking which have alienated many 
                                                          
56 Compare Held, Models of Democracy, esp. 35, for an overview of this modern approach. H. Arendt, The 
Human Condition (Chicago, 1958), is one of the most famous developments of this basic modern position. 
57 SEG 39.1243, col. I, ll. 16–22.  
58 I.Priene2 63, new edition of I.Priene 107, ll. 17–21. 
59 I.Priene2 68, ll. 13–14. 
60 Compare with these decrees Aristotle’s vision of man as a political animal; part of man’s natural function is to 
exercise civic virtue (see Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1178b5–6). 
61 I.Mylasa 109, ll. 7–10. 
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modern advocates of ideals of liberty: for example, strong patriotism, closely entwined with 
exclusivity and suspicion of outsiders, which went together with a strong focus on warfare. 
Most importantly for this paper, the Hellenistic cities might be thought to have perpetuated an 
older Greek disregard for individual liberty and difference, because they continued to impose 
a single model of the good life – the life of engaged, patriotic civic participation – on all.62 
However, a strong case can be made that the Hellenistic cities actually adapted traditional 
Greek community-centred civic ideals, especially in the later Hellenistic period, in a way 
which compensated for these features. 
For example, Hellenistic cities often relaxed exclusivity and particularism.63 They 
often celebrated abstract virtues, without specific local content, such as love of the good or 
the fine, which could easily be exercised and appreciated, not only by home citizens, but also 
by outsiders and immigrants, such as A. Aemilius Zosimos of Priene and all those honouring 
him.64 Among these abstract virtues the intrinsically universalist and explicitly humane virtue 
of philanthropia (‘love of humanity’) was increasingly celebrated, after c. 150 BC even as a 
tie between fellow citizens, who would earlier usually have been expected to interact solely 
through more visceral, particularist bonds;65 the Hellenistic cities were perhaps moving 
towards something with a stronger claim to the name of civic humanism. 
This all made it much easier to envisage more cosmopolitan versions of civic 
community, with broader horizons: from a more flexible local community of all those ‘living 
their lives together’, both citizens and foreigners,66 to institutionalised larger civic units, 
including both mergers of poleis (such as the Cos-Kalymna homopoliteia) and larger federal 
units (such as the Achaian League). This increasing cosmopolitanism, and co-operation 
across borders, went hand in hand with another significant shift, also most pronounced after 
c. 150 BC: the rising importance of culture and education, relative to warfare, at the centre of 
civic life. Warfare and military training long remained important,67 but the more cultural 
dimension of education in the gymnasium, the polis’ principal educational institution, came 
into increasing focus. Benefactors were regularly praised for their educational and cultural 
contributions, especially while exercising the office of gymnasiarch, charged with running 
the gymnasium.68 
Most importantly for my argument here, the Hellenistic cities also gave greater 
prominence in their public rhetoric to individual choice: in particular, the choices of 
individual citizens to aid their polis, based on both reflection and emotion. They did so by 
giving a new prominence to individuals’ psychology and choices in public epigraphy, 
especially honorary decrees for benefactors. In the case of earlier, more formulaic civic 
honorary decrees for home citizens, a style which endured through the Hellenistic period too, 
civic commitment tended to be treated more as an unquestionable given, or automatic reflex: 
the life of virtue (arete), goodwill (eunoia) and enthusiasm (prothymia) was the taken-for-
                                                          
62 For a relevant recent critical approach to the Greek polis, from a modern liberal perspective, see A. Ryan, On 
Politics. A History of Political Thought: from Herodotus to the Present (London 2012), esp. chs. 2–3, 14–15. 
63 Compare A. Heller and A.-V. Pont, Patrie d’origine et patries électives : les citoyennetés multiples dans le 
monde grec d’époque romaine (Bordeaux, 2012). 
64 See again I.Priene2 68, ll. 13–14. 
65 B. Gray, ‘The Polis Becomes Humane? Philanthropia as a Cardinal Civic Virtue in Later Hellenistic 
Honorific Epigraphy and Historiography’, Studi ellenistici 27 (2013), 137–62. 
66 See again I.Priene2 63, ll. 17–21; I.Priene2 68, ll. 13–14 . 
67 J. Ma, ‘Fighting Poleis of the Hellenistic World’, in H. van Wees (ed.), War and Violence in 
Ancient Greece (Swansea, 2000), 337–76; Th. Boulay, Arès dans la cité : les poleis et la guerre dans 
l’Asie Mineure hellénistique (Pisa and Rome, 2014). 
68 See recently D. Kah and P. Scholz (eds.), Das hellenistische Gymnasion (Berlin, 2004). For examples of 
relevant honorific language, see again the Prienian decrees for Zosimos, I.Priene2 68–70.  
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granted lifestyle and mindset of citizens born into patriotism.69 Many Hellenistic decrees, by 
contrast, especially after c. 150 BC, gave a much more complex picture of home citizens’ 
motivations, using much richer and more varied psychological vocabulary and concepts. 
This was already evident in the examples considered above from Colophon, Priene 
and Mylasa: in those, the motivations of citizen benefactors were explained through clauses 
beginning with participles of verbs of thinking and judging, to explain the internal reflection 
which had persuaded them to choose the path of civic engagement. Other aspects of this 
psychological turn included increasing interest in decrees in the role of civic education in 
forming the character and ideas of citizens. This was often described in quite complex 
psychological terms, including reference to the influence of education on citizens’ souls 
(psychai) themselves.70 This civic education (paideia) was explicitly presented as at the root 
of the considered, reliable civic dispositions of good citizens.71 The specific demands of the 
common good in a particular situation could even be presented as a matter for individual 
reflection and conscientious decision by informed, dedicated citizens: in a slightly earlier 
text, the Cos-Calymna homopoliteia of the later third century citizens had to promise, in a 
pledge first quoted above, to vote in accordance with ‘whatever seems to me (ὅ κά μοι δοκῆι) 
to be beneficial for the demos’,72 something which might differ between two different equally 
well-intentioned citizens. 
Abstract reflection about the psychology of civic virtue, previously mainly the 
preserve of philosophy and the most intellectual of Classical Athenian speeches,73 had thus 
become by the later Hellenistic period a sufficiently mainstream and urgent civic concern to 
gain prominence even in the routine, pragmatic, widely accessible forum of debates and 
inscribed decrees about honours.74 To couch the approach of relevant decrees in the terms of 
Greek philosophical thinking about freedom, the citizens who received honours in the mainly 
later Hellenistic inscriptions discussed above can be said to have fulfilled the conditions, not 
so much for being free (eleutheros), as for being ‘liberal’ or ‘free-spirited’ (eleutherios): they 
made considered, constructive, intelligent choices, not compelled by the pressures of material 
want or greed associated with slaves and the slavish.75 The word eleutherios itself is rare in 
inscriptions,76 but there is a different very significant overlap of vocabulary between 
Hellenistic epigraphy and this current in Greek philosophy: the word prohairesis (‘choice’), 
and the closely related word hairesis. In one of his classic formulations of the distinction 
between civic and slavish lifestyles, Aristotle claims that there could never be a polis of 
slaves or ‘the other animals’, because slaves and animals do not share in true happiness 
(eudaimonia) or in living in accordance with prohairesis (reflective choice).77 This notion of 
prohairesis, an ethical choice formed from a distinctive mixture of rational deliberation and 
desire, is central to Aristotle’s whole conception of virtuous (and vicious) action.78 
                                                          
69 For the formulaic expressions of value in Classical Athenian honorary decrees, see C. Veligianni-Terzi, 
Wertbegriffe in den attischen Ehrendekreten der klassischen Zeit (Stuttgart, 1997).  
70 See I.Priene2 68, ll. 74–7; I.Sestos 1 (120s BC), ll. 71–2. 
71 Consider SEG 39.1243, col. I; I.Iasos 98 (first century BC). 
72 IG XII 4 1 152, ll. 27–9. 
73 For the latter, see D. Allen, ‘Talking about Revolution: on Political Change in Fourth-Century 
Athens and Historiographic Method’, in S. Goldhill and R. Osborne (eds.), Rethinking Revolutions 
through Ancient Greece (Cambridge, 2006), 183–211; D. Allen, Why Plato Wrote (Chichester and 
Malden, 2010), Part II, discussing certain speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines. 
74 Compare L. Robert, Hellenica 11/12 (Paris, 1960), 213; L. Robert, ‘Sur les inscriptions d’Ephèse’, RPh ser. 3, 
no. 4, 7–84 (12, n. 1). 
75 Compare Aristotle Politics 1338b2–4. 
76 But note its use to praise a doctor’s treatment of his patients, in keeping with his education, in IG V I 1145 
(Gytheion, first century BC), ll. 25–7. 
77 Aristotle Politics 1280a30–3. 
78 See, for example, Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1106b36; 1113a10-11. 
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In more everyday civic rhetoric, from which many examples are presented in the 
following pages, prohairesis was used to describe something slightly different, though 
closely related: something closer to what Aristotle himself would call an ἕξις προαιρετική,79 a 
long-term ‘preferential disposition’ to make certain kinds of choices,80 itself the product of 
long-term aspiration, habituation and repeated choices.81 It was thus used there to capture a 
disposition which was itself chosen, at least indirectly, but also then issued in further choices. 
As Allen has argued, this kind of usage begins to appear in the more sophisticated, abstract 
speeches of certain orators of the Athenian democracy after c. 350 BC, as a way of describing 
the civic dispositions of citizens.82 This usage was quite slow to enter the usually more 
pedestrian and demotic rhetoric of inscriptions for public consumption. It begins to appear in 
later fourth-century inscriptions of Greek cities as a way of describing the ‘dispositions’ of 
new Hellenistic kings, and their powerful agents, to be favourable to particular cities.83 This 
usage in relation to external potentates is attested throughout the Hellenistic period. From the 
third century BC onwards, prohairesis was also sometimes used to describe the ‘disposition’ 
of the demos of a particular city.84 It is perhaps not surprising that cities should have readily 
referred to the ‘preferential dispositions’ of powerful kings and foreigners, or of whole, 
autonomous poleis. More interestingly, from the third century BC onwards,85 and most 
commonly after c. 200 BC,86 cities also praised their own individual citizens, and benevolent 
citizens of other cities, for their individual prohaireseis, usually extended, ongoing 
prohaireseis to act benevolently towards the city, fusions of desire, emotion and rational 
thought.87 Although the word was used alongside other terms for favourable dispositions to 
the demos, its connection with ‘choice’ certainly remained alive: for example, Polemaios of 
Colophon was praised for his prohairesis of life, in whose benefits he wished to make his 
fellow citizens sharers (κοινωνοὺς ... τῆς τοῦ βίου προαιρέσεως).88 
There are several potential strong objections to seeing this ‘psychological turn’ in 
decrees, including the increasing interest in prohairesis, as part of a vibrant stream of 
distinctive, civic humanist thinking. Perhaps the most obvious counter-interpretation would 
be to see the psychological turn as a straightforward reflection of a move towards greater 
hierarchy in poleis’ organisation and culture: a step away from civic equality and civic 
humanism. As Gauthier argued, modifying the arguments of Veyne,89 cities’ political life 
underwent a decisive shift around the second century BC, especially after c. 150 BC: while 
                                                          
79 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1106b36. 
80 Compare J. Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy (Göttingen, 1978), 169–74, discussing this usage in 
Hellenistic epigraphy and Polybius.  
81 Compare D. Charles, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action (London, 1984), esp. 137-43; A.A. Long, Epictetus: a 
Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (Oxford, 2002), 212-14. 
82 Allen, ‘Talking about Revolution’. 
83 See IG II2 469 (Athens, 306/305 BC), ll. 6-7, and 558 (303/2 BC), l. 13. 
84 See, for example, I.Priene2 107, new edition of I.Priene 8 (c. 330–300/286/85 BC; decree of Priene for 
Phokaia, Nisyros and Astypalaia, and foreign judges they had sent), ll. 38–40; I.Priene2 28, new edition of 
I.Priene 17 (Priene, after 278/77 BC; decree for Sotas), ll. 43–6; I.Milet I 3 145 (Miletus, 200/199 BC; decree 
for Eudemos, school-founder), ll. 80–1. 
85 E.g. IG XII 6 1 11 (Samos, after 243/2 BC; decree for Boulagoras), ll. 53–4. 
86 Many examples of this usage from this later period in relation to home citizens are discussed in the rest of this 
section. In addition to those, consider, for example, IG II2 1006 (Athens, 122/1 BC), ll. 32–3. For this usage in 
decrees for individual citizens of other cities, see n. 91 below. 
87 For these developments in the use of the word, compare A. Chaniotis, ‘Affective Diplomacy: Emotional 
Scripts between Greek Communities and Roman Authorities during the Republic’, in D. Cairns and L. 
Fulkerson (eds.), Emotions between Greece and Rome (London, 2015), 87–103 (96–7). For the intellectual 
component of prohairesis, accompanying its emotional component,  see especially IG V 1 1370 (Kalamai, c. 
50–1 BC), l. 4. 
88 SEG 39.1243, col. I, ll. 11–16. 
89 P. Veyne, Le pain et le cirque : sociologie historique d'un pluralisme politique (Paris, 1976). 
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many traditional civic institutions endured, an increasingly narrow civic elite began to 
exercise much greater dominance in civic life, gaining new opportunities to exercise civic 
leadership and power without always undergoing the rigorous scrutiny from civic institutions 
associated with traditional, rotating magistracies. For Gauthier, the increasingly abstract and 
psychological quality of later Hellenistic decrees for citizens was a reflection of this process: 
after the eclipse of the Hellenistic kingdoms by the Romans, cities began sometimes to treat 
their own elite benefactors as quasi-kings, imbued with paternalistic affection towards their 
cities.90 The development in the use of the word prohairesis in decrees, outlined above, might 
lend some support to this theory: a term first applied to kings came to be applied to elite 
benefactors. 
However, this interpretation cannot account for the whole phenomenon, including the 
orientation of much later Hellenistic psychological rhetoric: as has already been seen, decrees 
tended to represent benefactors’ complex motivations and choices as intricately bound up 
with membership of a participatory civic community. Sometimes, as in the examples 
discussed at the start of this section, benefactors were explicitly said to recognise their 
interdependence with their fellow citizens: their fortunes were inextricably entwined. More 
generally, citizens’ psychological states, including their prohaireseis, tended to be presented, 
in a truly ‘developmental’, civic humanist manner, as closely embedded in civic relationships 
and institutions. 
For one thing, as discussed above, decrees often stressed the role of civic education 
and habituation in forming and sustaining citizens’ dispositions and prohaireseis. It might be 
objected that cities also praised in often interchangeable ways the prohaireseis of foreign 
benefactors, usually citizens of other cities who would not have benefited from the honouring 
city’s local civic education.91 However, even those foreigners would normally have benefited 
from similar civic education in their home city, part of an increasingly unified civic world, as 
well as exposure to the honouring city’s virtuous ethos:92 they too were, like home citizens, 
good civic Greeks, beneficiaries of polis education and habituation. 
Moreover, trusted foreigners as well as home citizens could benefit directly from the 
other ‘developmental’ role of the honouring polis: its role in enabling and encouraging the 
sympathetic, supportive, long-term relationships among fellow citizens, and between citizens 
and favoured foreigners, which allowed prohaireseis and similar dispositions to flourish. 
Indeed, a prohairesis was almost always presented in decrees as relational: as directed 
towards other people, especially the honouring demos.93 The implication was that a well-
functioning polis was, if not a necessary, at least a very propitious environment for 
developing, sustaining and exercising genuine, stable, informed choice. Within such a polis, 
individuals could enjoy relationships with their fellows which were sufficiently close, 
trusting, equal and open to enable them to interact through unconstrained, sincere 
prohaireseis, as well as to engage in mutual ethical education. In this environment, 
                                                          
90 See Ph. Gauthier, Les cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs (Athens and Paris, 1985), esp. 56-9, 
critically discussed in R. van Bremen, The Limits of Participation: Women and Civic Life in the Greek 
East in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods (Amsterdam, 1996), 11-12. On the distinctive political 
culture of the later Hellenistic period, see also F. Quaß, Die Honoratiorenschicht in den Städten des 
griechischen Ostens (Stuttgart, 1993) and P. Fröhlich and Chr. Müller (eds.), Citoyenneté et 
participation à la basse époque hellénistique : actes de la table ronde des 22 et 23 mai 2004 (Geneva, 
2005). 
91 See, for example, among many surviving examples from after c. 200 BC: IG XI 4 789 (Delos, early second 
century BC), ll. 14–15; FD III 2.91 (Delphi, 167 BC), ll. 10–11. 
92 Cf. SEG 39.1243, col. III, ll. 36–7. 
93 See, for example, among very many cases, I.Magnesia 92b (early second century BC), ll. 10–11 (prohairesis 
of the citizen Apollophanes, benefactor of the theatre, towards his patris). For the value of relational, mutual 
prohaireseis, compare Aristotle Eudemian Ethics 1236b1–3. 
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individuals could trust that a sincere ethical choice to be public-spirited would not lay them 
open to exploitation by those willing to capitalise on others’ generosity. On the contrary, it 
would bring both fulfilment and honour. Even the use of similar rhetoric in relation to the 
most powerful foreigners, including kings and royal officials, can also be interpreted along 
these lines: its point was not to stress (for example) the king’s regal will, but rather to 
integrate the powerful outsider within an enlarged civic (quasi-)community based on ethics 
and trust.94 
Such strong insistence on civic humanist values and psychology, even in the routine, 
pragmatic medium of civic epigraphy, need not be seen as a denial of Hellenistic changes, a 
make-believe construction of civic continuity. It should rather be seen as a grounded but 
imaginative response to a changing environment. Intensified interest in individual choice and 
motivation was partly a recognition of changes in social reality. Those born into citizenship 
in a Greek city were now less likely to be automatically, viscerally bound to it for life. The 
wealthy had plentiful opportunities to exert initiative above and beyond the scrutiny of civic 
institutions, or even to leave the polis – or even the civic world – altogether. They could 
enjoy double or multiple citizenships in different cities, which became increasingly common 
by the later Hellenistic period;95 enter the courts and administration of the Hellenistic 
kingdoms or the new Roman Empire; or migrate to new metropoleis such as Alexandria and 
Rome. Even the less wealthy had increased opportunities to migrate, or to adopt mobile 
lifestyles as (for example) traders or mercenaries. This all made it a practical reality that 
ideals of civic engagement and solidarity, the lifestyle of the ‘polis fanatic’,96 had always to 
be consciously embraced by participants, rather than unthinkingly assimilated. 
As well as recognising this new reality of increased personal choice, the Hellenistic 
cities were also attempting to shape the choices made. Especially after c. 150 BC, they had to 
take account of sharp inequality, a lack of automatic interpersonal trust, and the limited 
efficacy of institutions and laws alone. Since formal constraints were inadequate in 
themselves to regulate citizens’ behaviour and check anti-civic tendencies, it was crucial for 
citizens to scrutinise the psychology and choices of their fellow citizens for signs of integrity 
or potential defection. At the same time, they had to cajole influential citizens towards 
voluntary embrace of civic virtue and the common good, so that they would use the 
individual initiative open to them for public-spirited ends.97 
This made it imperative for poleis to use all means at their disposal, from civic 
paideia to the honorific process itself, to analyse and shape leading citizens’ motivations. 
This helps to explain the sharper psychological insight and complexity of later Hellenistic 
decrees, as well as their self-conscious efforts actively to shape citizens’ thinking and desires. 
Decrees’ authors pursued this latter aim partly through characteristic ‘hortatory clauses’, 
urging other citizens to emulate the benefactor being honoured,98 but also through their 
representation of the habits and lifestyle of the honorand himself as dignified, praiseworthy 
and desirable. Emphasis on personal choice, or prohairesis, was central to this rhetoric: 
decrees tried to show that civic engagement within a polis was much better suited to genuine 
freedom of choice than more capricious environments which might attract citizens, such as a 
Hellenistic court or a cosmopolitan port society such as Delos. 
                                                          
94 Compare Ma, Antiochos III, ch. 4; J. Ma, Statues and Cities: Honorific Portraits and Civic Identity 
in the Hellenistic World (Oxford, 2013), esp. Part I. 
95 See the papers in Heller and Pont, Patrie d’origine et patries électives. 
96 M. Wörrle, ‘Vom tugendsamen Jüngling zum “gestreßten” Euergeten. Überlegungen zum Bürgerbild 
hellenistischer Ehrendekrete’, in M. Wörrle and P. Zanker (eds.), Stadtbild und Bürgerbild im Hellenismus 
(Munich, 1995), 241–50. 
97 Compare Allen, ‘Talking about Revolution’, on prohairesis in later Classical Athenian oratory. 
98 See, for example, I.Sestos 1, ll. 86–92. 
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It might still be objected, however, that prohairesis within the polis was open only to 
members of the very wealthy male elite, who had the resources to obtain a sophisticated 
education and to contribute substantially to their cities. It is true that only the prohaireseis of 
elite citizens who received honorary decrees were singled out for public praise. Nonetheless, 
this elite group did at least, by the later Hellenistic period, include women whose 
prohaireseis could be celebrated.99 Moreover, other, less prominent citizens could still 
emulate elite citizens’ considered, engaged choices. All citizens could participate in the 
collective ethical prohairesis of a city’s demos to appreciate and honour the virtues of a 
benefactor.100 Decrees’ hortatory clauses could also explicitly express the aspiration to 
encourage a broader spectrum of citizens, even ‘many citizens’, to emulate those acting on a 
prohairesis to aid the polis.101 Moreover, an alternative stage for many less elite citizens to 
act on prohaireseis was provided by the very many civic associations of the Hellenistic 
world, microcosms of full poleis incorporating citizens, outsiders or a combination of both, 
with their own miniature civic institutions and practices.102 For example, an association of 
worshippers of Aphrodite (Aphrodisiastai) in Ephesus, perhaps an association of merchants 
including foreigners, passed an honorary decree expressing the wish to urge those with a 
hairesis to love the good (τοὺς αἱρουμένους φιλαγαθεῖν) to give attention to common 
affairs.103 This rhetoric overlapped with that of a more official sub-division of the Ephesian 
community: the young men of Ephesus, ephebes and neoi, passed a decree in the first century 
BC praising their gymnasiarch Diodoros for wishing to make worthy of remembrance the 
‘hairesis which he has about him, oriented towards the finest things’ (τὴν οὖσαν περὶ αὐτὸν 
αἵρεσιν πρὸς τὰ κάλλ[ισ]τα).104 
After the objection emphasising hierarchy, the second potential strong objection to 
seeing decrees’ psychological turn as an intensification in their civic humanist tendencies 
would be to interpret it instead as evidence of a broader turn inward: a shift in focus from 
public, civic affairs and glory to the internal lives of individuals, prefiguring the rise of 
Christianity and of Christian focus on the soul. It is true that such a shift is detectable in some 
Greek thinking of the Hellenistic and early Roman Imperial periods, especially some Stoic 
and Epicurean philosophy. This tendency was brought to a head by the early Imperial Stoic 
Epictetus. 
Epictetus even offered a distinctive conception of prohairesis itself. As Long has 
shown, Epictetus recast the word prohairesis to describe something like a faculty of volition: 
a ‘mentality’ or ‘agency’ or ‘capacity’ which enables humans to make choices, and can 
remain immune to even the most severe pressure from outside. In Epictetus’ thought, in 
keeping with the Stoic tradition, the only secure route to virtue, and thus happiness, is to 
focus on those things which are truly within one’s own control, while ignoring or neutrally 
accepting external factors such as political developments. Central to this exercise is the 
maintaining of a good prohairesis within one’s soul, which no tyrant, misfortune or 
disorderly internal desires can dominate or divert from its purposes.105 This and related 
tendencies in Epictetus’ thought are central to Hannah Arendt’s influential argument that the 
                                                          
99 Consider SEG 33.1036 (Kyme, second century BC), ll. 30–4. On the civic role of women in this period: van 
Bremen, The Limits of Participation. 
100 See n. 84 above. 
101 See IG XII 6 1 11, ll. 52–4; compare I.Sestos 1, ll. 86–92. 
102 See I. Arnaoutoglou, Thusias heneka kai sunousias: Private Religious Associations in Hellenistic Athens 
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103 SEG 43.773 (second century BC), ll. 12–14. 
104 I.Ephesos 6, ll. 23–5. 
105 Long, Epictetus, 218–222. See, for example, Epictetus Discourses 2.2.1–7. For the broader intellectual 
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post-Classical Greeks fatally abandoned their distinctive interest in the freedom which comes 
through action, performed within the polis, in favour of an interest in the supposed inner 
freedom of the soul, which can be achieved even if one is a ‘slave in the world’.106 
It is certainly true that decrees’ increased psychological complexity reflected and 
promoted the development of more sophisticated understandings of human motivation, 
thought and desire. However, as the examples already studied demonstrate, this development 
was not tied to a diminished interest in action. For example, in civic rhetoric, prohairesis was 
not treated as a relatively content-free, context-independent faculty of volition, as in 
Epictetus’ thought. Rather, the drafters of decrees treated a prohairesis as a substantive 
ethical disposition, with close and inevitable links to particular actions in the civic world.107 
Indeed, honorary decrees usually described benefactors’ specific actions and benefactions, 
sometimes in great detail,108 as well as the underlying psychological states. 
Those psychological states, including prohairesis, were treated as valuable partly 
because they could inspire citizens, not merely to accept, but actively to shape the external 
world, through civic-spirited action. The worldliness of civic prohairesis is perhaps most 
vividly reflected in a late third century inscription from Chios, praising those citizens who 
had contributed to the building of civic fortifications ‘through their own prohairesis’, 
‘wishing that their fatherland should remain free and autonomous through everything’.109 
These citizens’ prohairesis was anything but a purely internal will; it was intimately linked 
with war, defence and collective freedom in the world. This is, admittedly, an unusual case: 
many other Hellenistic citizens had to find a more pacific and cultural focus for their 
prohaireseis, as diplomats or as social and cultural benefactors of their fellow citizens.110  
However, even prohaireseis with a predominantly cultural focus could be presented as aimed 
at external glory in the world: in honouring their gymnasiarch Paramonos in 95 BC, the 
young men (neoi) of Thessalonike deemed it ‘just’ that those employing a glory-loving 
prohairesis (τ̣οὺς φιλοδόξῳ προα̣[ιρέ]σει χρ̣ωμ̣ένους), such as this man, should receive 
appropriate honours.111 Moreover, in this and many other cases, the prohaireseis of good 
cultural benefactors were still seen as closely linked with action: the active contributions of 
Paramonos included spending money, organising sacrifices and honours, and training and 
disciplining the young men in the gymnasium.112 These would not have been treated as trivial 
activities: they were designed to create the next generation of virtuous, engaged citizens. 
This analysis has some overlap with Foucault’s interpretation of post-Classical Greek 
interiority and sense of self, influenced by the work of Veyne on civic politics. According to 
Foucault, the post-Classical ancient Greeks did not simply withdraw from politics and action, 
as Arendt and others have suggested. Rather, they problematised to a new degree the 
relationship between the individual self, social and political roles and identities, and action. 
Since these three things were no longer treated as always automatically linked, it became 
necessary to investigate more deeply how and why the individual self performs certain 
accepted political roles and characteristic activities – or engages with the social world at 
all.113 Internal psychology and external action were thus treated, not as exclusive opposites, 
but as locked together in a close-knit dynamic relationship. The Hellenistic cities, especially 
                                                          
106 H. Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, with an introduction by J. Kohn 
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the later Hellenistic cities, might even be said to have developed an ideology which achieved 
a mean between excessively political and excessively ethical or psychological conceptions of 
individual freedom. According to Hellenistic inscriptions’ ideology, as reconstructed here, 
the individual citizen’s freedom has a rich psychological and ethical dimension, but it can 
also – perhaps must also – be exercised in civic relationships and activities, structured by 
civic institutions. 
A final significant objection to my argument would be to claim that the Hellenistic 
cities did not, in fact, allow or celebrate any genuine choice for their citizens: choice of one 
alternative over another. There are weaknesses in this objection. Bad prohaireseis, worthy of 
disapproval, were certainly conceivable for Hellenistic Greeks,114 even though they were 
understandably not foregrounded in decrees. The kind of civic prohairesis celebrated in 
decrees was thus a choice of this lifestyle over a less public-spirited alternative. It might still 
be objected that Hellenistic cities did not allow for a range of different legitimate 
prohaireseis: a properly educated and socially integrated citizen, who rose above base 
desires, would always come to the same choice of life. 
There are, however, some signs of pluralism about legitimate life-choices in 
Hellenistic civic ideology, especially after c. 150 BC. By the later second century BC, some 
time after prohairesis and hairesis had come to be standard terms in civic rhetoric for 
individuals’ civic Weltanschauungen, Greeks had begun to refer to the doctrines and 
practices of the different philosophical schools (e.g. Stoic, Epicurean, Peripatetic, Academic) 
as themselves different haireseis: different ‘schools of thought’ or ‘persuasions’. For an 
individual to identify with one of these schools was thus for him to make a considered choice 
of interconnected philosophy and lifestyle.115 The Hellenistic Athenians, who hosted the main 
Athenian philosophical schools, recognised in their official civic discourse the simultaneous 
validity of different philosophical haireseis. For example, they sent on their famous 
‘philosophers’ embassy’ to Rome in 155 BC the heads of the Stoa, Academy and 
Peripatos.116 The late Hellenistic ephebic curriculum also included lectures at the different 
venues of the Academy, Lyceum and Ptolemaion: these places were at least symbolic of 
different philosophical approaches, and may well also each have hosted advocates of 
different philosophies.117 
Post-Classical civic Greeks could also explicitly acknowledge the validity of different 
possible choices of lifestyle. These included different choices of a particular sphere of civic 
life on which to focus: for example, politics, administration, commerce, athletics, literature, 
philosophy or history. Plutarch, for example, argued in the early Imperial period that the life 
of active political leadership is itself a distinctive course, which should be pursued only by 
those most suited to it, who can embrace it through a stable, reflective prohairesis based on 
judgement and reason, as opposed to whim or opportunism.118 This echoes an example 
discussed above. The later Hellenistic Colophonians praised their citizen Polemaios for 
choosing to make his fellow citizens sharers in the fruits of his ‘prohairesis of life’ as a 
successful athlete. Polemaios subsequently recognised the value of another lifestyle choice, 
as a complement to his athletic successes: engagement in political leadership.119 This is later 
                                                          
114 Consider Polybius 2.56.5; 60.5–6. 
115 For full discussion see Glucker, Antiochus, 174–92. On ancient philosophies as ‘ways of life’, see recently J. 
Cooper, Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy from Socrates to Plotinus (Princeton, 
2012). 
116 See, for example, Plutarch Cato Maior 22; M. Haake, Der Philosoph in der Stadt: Untersuchungen 
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117 IG II2 1006 (122/1 BC), ll. 19–20, with the cautionary remarks of Haake, Der Philosoph in der Stadt, 44–55. 
118 Plutarch Precepts of Statecraft 798c-799b. 
119 SEG 39.1243, col. I, ll. 11–22. 
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said to have relieved other citizens of the burden of political activity, so that they could 
concentrate on their own affairs (ta idia);120 these would presumably have included pursuit of 
other, less political prohaireseis within the polis. 
A later Hellenistic decree could even explicitly praise the individuality of a citizen’s 
prohairesis. The second-century female benefactor Archippe of Kyme was given special 
authority by decree to undertake refurbishment of the city’s council-chamber ‘in accordance 
with her own trust and prohairesis’ (κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν πίστιν καὶ προαίρεσιν).121 There is an 
interesting use of similar phrasing to convey a more wide-ranging personal outlook in a first-
century BC Iasian decree for the young citizen Melanion, who was praised for giving a fine 
demonstration of his ‘own prohairesis’122 (καλὸν ὑπόδειγμα τῆς ἰδίας προαιρέσεως 
καταβαλλόμενος) through his self-controlled behaviour, worthy of emulation. This emphasis 
on the distinctiveness of his personal prohairesis must partly have been intended to indicate 
that he had assimilated, and made his own, the family virtues he had inherited, also 
emphasised in the decree. Nonetheless, it must also be significant that Melanion has at this 
point just been praised at length for his education, including his philosophical studies: the 
juxtaposition implies that he has developed his own sophisticated, personal outlook and 
choice of life.123 
This is not to deny that the Iasians also strove in this decree, in keeping with a 
familiar pattern, to show that Melanion’s personal choice and individuality were safely 
embedded in civic norms and institutions, including ideals of self-control. This approach can 
itself, however, be interpreted as evidence of an anxious awareness of the possibility of 
individualistic personal choice trumping or disrupting communal norms and needs. The 
subsequent development of the words prohairesis and especially hairesis in the Roman 
Empire hovers over earlier usages: hairesis, or ‘heresy’, came to describe a disruptive, non-
conformist creed or attitude, or the ‘sect’ endorsing it. This development tapped into the 
Hellenistic uses of the word to describe both philosophical persuasions and personal life 
choices.124 The Hellenistic civic Greeks were far more tolerant of informed personal choice 
or hairesis, or even idiosyncratic thinking. Nonetheless, they were aware of the risk that 
hairesis might slide into disruptive wilfulness, dogmatism or eccentricity: it was crucial that 
the individual citizen’s hairesis should remain distinctively civic and self-controlled, tied to 
recognition of the civic humanist insight that communal political life is the key to true 
individual fulfilment. 
 
4. Conclusion: new Hellenistic models of citizen liberty 
The Hellenistic poleis were certainly no ideal cities: socio-economic and political 
inequalities, for example, were marked. Moreover, some of the ideals discussed in this paper 
were no doubt sometimes abused for short-term gain, not least by members of wealthy civic 
elites eager to justify their privileges and evade scrutiny through a veneer of virtue. 
Nonetheless, as this paper has argued, Hellenistic cities, and especially their values and 
ideologies, offer valuable case-studies for modern students of civic and republican  
government and political culture. This is not least because Hellenistic cities experimented 
with adaptations to the civic ideals they had inherited. In particular, they experimented with 
                                                          
120 SEG 39.1243, col. II, ll. 16–18. 
121 SEG 33.1040, ll. 21–3. 
122 This expression could also be used of a foreign benefactor (SEG 3.468, Thaumakoi in Achaia Phthiotis, first 
century BC, l. 14) or a whole demos (SEG 42.1065, Claros, 200-150 BC, ll. 16–20). 
123 I.Iasos 98, esp. ll. 10–22. 
124 Compare Glucker, Antiochus, 186–7, 192; M. Simon, ‘From Greek Hairesis to Christian Heresy’, in W. R. 
Schoedel and R. L.Wilken (eds.), Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition (Paris, 
1979), 101–116; E. Iricinschi and H.M. Zellentin (eds.), Heresy and Identity in Late Antiquity (Tübingen, 2008), 
introduction, 3–5. 
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ways of combining robust and demanding civic institutions and expectations with distinctive 
types of individual freedom. 
Some Hellenistic Greeks, such as Polybius, were in tune with the strictly republican  
debates and ideals of the Roman Republic, emphasising that collective freedom from tyranny 
brings a special type of freedom also for the parts within the whole. However, other types of 
concern with the individual citizen’s freedom were more prominent in mainstream Hellenistic 
civic discourse. For one thing, Hellenistic cities showed a distinctive interest in the quasi-
liberal ‘protective’ freedoms of the individual citizen, especially individual freedoms 
concerning property and property-disputes. Indeed, they even normalised the summoning of 
foreign judges to decide difficult financial disputes: as shown above, this must have been 
partly driven by particular concern with safeguarding the free access of individual citizens to 
fair, neutral dispute resolution, even if that required some sacrifice of local sovereignty. 
More significantly, Hellenistic cities were also innovative, especially after c. 150 BC, 
in adapting civic humanist ideals and practices, in such a way as to give more scope to 
individual choice and to diversity within the citizen-body. Indeed, Hellenistic cities’ decrees, 
especially later ones, placed a new emphasis, previously unusual in such practical 
applications of Greek civic humanism, on individual ethical choice, within the scope of civic 
law and institutions. According to their ideology, cities were not ‘forcing citizens to be free’, 
but rather providing the ideal context for them to develop genuine, reflective, sustainable 
ethical choices, through participation in the unique types of education and social interaction 
made possible by a polis. In changed times, which created more space for culture and 
philosophy within civic life, especially in the later Hellenistic polis,  citizens had wide scope 
to develop their ethical outlook and choices through participation in gentle, reflective, 
cosmopolitan politics, increasingly open to women and foreigners as well as male citizens.125 
This all makes the Hellenistic cities well worthy of attention in contemporary debates 
about civic humanism, the common good and freedom: they offer revealing precedents for 
modern theorists engaged in developing political theories and values which combine a civic 
humanist insistence on the intrinsic value of civic participation and dedication to the common 
good, on the one hand, with the embrace of individual choice and pluralism, on the other.126 
Treating ancient Greek politics as a serious civic model need not involve aspirations to ‘slip 
back into the womb of the polis’:127 the post-Classical evidence shows that an ancient Greek 
polis could aspire to be much more cosmopolitan, cultural, open and individualist, and less 
war-like and close-knit, than either the modern stereotype or the earlier Classical reality of 
polis life. Indeed, the Hellenistic cities’ example suggests that, in certain circumstances, a 
civic humanist polis can itself promote voluntary, free-spirited, reflective membership and 
loyalty, of types which do not stifle individual choice and difference, but subtly encourage 
them. 
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